A CGE-Model Analysis of U.S. Imposed Automotive Tariffs by Li, Angela
Undergraduate Economic Review
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 14
2019
A CGE-Model Analysis of U.S. Imposed
Automotive Tariffs
Angela Li
University of Toronto Schools, lian@utschools.ca
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Li, Angela (2018) "A CGE-Model Analysis of U.S. Imposed Automotive Tariffs," Undergraduate Economic Review: Vol.
15 : Iss. 1 , Article 14.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/14
A CGE-Model Analysis of U.S. Imposed Automotive Tariffs
Abstract
Using a computable generable equilibrium (CGE) model, this research paper evaluates the effects of a U.S.
imposed 25% automotive import tariff on NAFTA countries and the European Union, the greatest U.S.
automotive trade partners. Three simulations were conducted: the implementation of tariffs with no
retaliation, equivalent retaliation on the same products, and retaliation on the top exports of politically
significant states, with sensitivity analysis applied in the final scenario. The results demonstrate that the EU is
marginally affected while the NAFTA countries experience the greatest increases in prices and reduction in
total wages.
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1. Introduction 
On May 23, 2018, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced an investigation under 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 on whether imports of automobiles, sport utility 
vehicles, vans and light trucks, and automotive parts pose a threat to the “national security” of 
the United States. Within 270 days after the investigation, Commerce will submit a report to 
President Trump with a decision on the subject and recommendations for action, likely to be 
tariffs if the goods are affirmed to be a threat to national security. In light of Trump’s belligerent 
rhetoric and proposals for 25% import tariffs on automotive parts and finished vehicles, the 
likelihood of following the direction of the steel and aluminum tariffs imposed in March are 
high. Nearly 98% of the targeted automotive imports by value would affect the European Union, 
Canada, Japan, Mexico, and South Korea, all of which are key allies to the U.S. Although 
Trump’s meeting with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in July resulted in 
negotiations for eliminating tariffs between the two countries, no specific commitments were 
made on the threatened automotive tariffs, indicating that the potential for tariffs on European 
Union automotive imports still exists. The consensus among U.S. lawmakers and the auto 
industry is that automotive tariffs would only hike prices for consumers and harm overall 
employment. 
This research paper analyzes the net economic impacts of a 25% import tariff on 
automotive parts and finished vehicles from all countries without exemptions under three 
scenarios: implementation of tariffs with no retaliation, tariffs with retaliation at the same rate 
back on the same automotive products from Canada, Mexico, the EU and Japan, and tariffs with 
retaliatory measures imposed by the same aforementioned countries on the top exports of 
politically significant states in the U.S (coal, oil and petroleum and coal products). The focus on 
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the paper is on the impacts on impacts to workers, consumers and overall welfare in the 3 
NAFTA countries and the EU. These regions were chosen specifically as Canada, Mexico and 
the EU form the greatest share of the value of U.S. automotive exports and imports, as stated by 
the Peterson Institute for International Economics (2018). 
 Compared to other studies on the subject, the paper focuses on broader scenarios, with 
emphasis on analyzing how the different forms of retaliation affect the countries in question. The 
computable general equilibrium model used in this paper accounts for the tariff being imposed 
with no exemptions, with shocks applied to all countries. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis is 
applied, where elasticity is doubled to gauge the effects of more substitutable automotive 
products.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature and Section 3 
explains how the GTAP CGE model is used as a quantitative framework. Section 4 describes the 
current trade context for the U.S., Canada, Mexico, the EU and Japan, Section 5 examines the 
results and Section 6 summarizes the conclusions of the paper’s findings.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
Given the recent nature of the proposed tariffs, there have not been extensive studies released 
which have analyzed its impacts. Of the studies available, there has been a focus on short term 
impacts over a 1-3 year period, with the assumption that producers have limited ability to 
significantly increase domestic production to replace imports and to diverge sourcing away from 
the complex cross-border supply chains. Among these studies however, there is general 
consensus that the United States’ proposed tariffs of 25% on imports from the automotive sector 
would pose significant harms overall to American workers. Francois, Baughman and Anthony 
(2018) conducted a study using a structurally estimated general equilibrium (SEGE) model of 
production and trade which integrates the GTAP database. They concluded that, assuming no 
retaliation, the imposed tariffs would cause an increase of 92,000 high-skilled jobs the auto 
sector which would be offset by the loss of 250,000 other high-skilled and low-skilled jobs in 
other sectors of the economy. The study conducted by Francois et. al noted how the varying 
impacts resulting from this policy were interconnected. They predicted that the highest loss of 
jobs would be in the service sector jobs, such as those related to trade and distribution, 
construction and high-skilled business and professional services, as these are the jobs most 
dependent on production in the manufacturing sectors. The manufacturing sector would be 
harmed by the tariffs, which raise the price for motor vehicles and parts--for instance, tariffs 
would add approximately $6400 to the price of an imported higher costs for motor vehicles and 
parts. In the study, overall impacts on the economy were also assessed. Tariffs are estimated to 
cause a net decline in the output of the U.S. economy of 0.1 percent in the time period of 1-3 
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years, due to higher prices which makes U.S. exports less competitive, and new car purchases 
more expensive. 
 
Another study conducted by Robinson et.al (2018) of the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics used a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) simulation model, called 
GLOBE. They analyzed both the scenario where there is no retaliation and one with retaliation 
on the same products. They concluded that in the former case approximately 195,000 U.S. jobs 
overall would be lost, whereas in the latter 624,000 US jobs would be lost, and 5 percent of the 
workforce in the auto and parts sectors would be displaced. Their findings emphasize how reliant 
the domestic sectors in the U.S. are on intermediate inputs that are not produced in the United 
States currently or that do not have a readily accessible U.S. produced substitute. Consistent with 
most other studies, prices are expected to rise for both imported and domestically produced 
vehicles. According to Robinson et.al,  some automakers may shift production locations to the 
United States to avoid tariffs; however, it is a complex decision which may not necessarily 
always result in relocation to the U.S. as there are the considerations of the cost of broken supply 
chains, investment uncertainties from Trump’s volatile trade policies and reduced demand due to 
higher prices.  
 
This is corroborated by the Centre for Automotive Research study which used a simulation 
model of the U.S light vehicle industry assuming unitary demand elasticity and that the full costs 
of the imposed tariff or quota are fully passed through to consumer prices. The study 
demonstrated how the declining demand for automotive vehicles (of up to 2 million vehicles) 
would be associated with employment losses from over 82, 000 to nearly 750, 000 jobs, a $6.4 
4
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billion decline in the U.S. Gross Domestic Product. The Centre’s study focused on how new 
vehicle dealerships would be substantially harmed, having impacts for the wider U.S. economy 
as well, given that these businesses collectively employ more than 1.1 million people. The 
United States’ 17,000 new vehicle dealerships provide significant contributions to the U.S. 
economy. Employment in these new vehicle dealerships would decline by 28,800 workers, to 
117,500 workers. 
 
Due to the interconnected nature and magnitude of trade between the three NAFTA 
countries, the tariff will be particularly harmful for Canada and Mexico. The effects on Canada 
have also been studied by DePratto (2018), who demonstrated how given the concentration of 
the auto sector, the province of Ontario in Canada would be the most impacted by the tariffs, 
with growth reduced by up to two percentage points. The impact would reach far beyond just the 
auto sector, as other manufacturers supply auto companies with intermediate inputs such as 
packaging material, glassmakers and die casting. The entire manufacturing sector of Canada 
would be affected, with a potential loss of 1 in 5 manufacturing jobs nationwide. Mexico would 
experience potentially even graver losses, as many automotive corporations have assembly plants 
specifically to serve the U.S. market. According to Linnane (2018) Mexico exported 82% of its 
produced vehicles in 2017, of which 84% was to the U.S. and Canada.  
5
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3. Model Design 
 
In this paper, the effects of Trump’s proposed tariffs on automobile parts and finished 
vehicles are studied with the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model GTAP.  This 
model, based on the GTAP database, is a tool used worldwide for empirical economic analysis. 
For example, most recently, it was used by the U.S. Commerce Department and Canadian 
Finance Ministry to analyze the impact of the steel and aluminum tariffs. The following 
paragraphs discuss how the computable general equilibrium model framework with the GTAP 7 
data set is applied to study multiple scenarios of reactive measures to the tariffs imposed by the 
U.S. on imports from the auto sector.  
 
3.1 The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model 
The CGE model serves to proxy the global economic system by simplifying interactions 
between important economic agents such as consumers, producers and the government. It is 
based on numerous assumptions, such as cost-minimizing behaviour by producers, average-cost 
pricing, and household demands based on optimizing behaviour. Households and businesses that 
are defined in each model interact on a microeconomic level through transactions, feeding into 
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macroeconomic relationships such as employment, GDP growth and investment. According to 
Wing and Balistreri (2012), CGE models are often referred to as micro-macro models because of 
that structure.  
 
 
The framework is illustrated below in Figure 1 in a circular flow diagram, which depicts 
the various interactions in a simplified economy. Consumers (represented by households below) 
purchase goods and services from domestic producers, as well as import finished goods from 
other countries, while producers (represented by enterprises below) pay consumers for the 
factors of production they provide through capital rent and wages. Furthermore, producers 
purchase intermediate inputs from each other, import intermediate goods and export goods and 
intermediate inputs to other countries. The government interacts in the economy as well by 
paying subsidies and transfers to consumers and taxing both consumers and producers. The 
analysis on U.S. imposed auto tariffs will focus on the transactions between the four economic 
agents: consumers, producers, the government, and foreign firms. 
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Figure 1: Circular Flow Diagram of Interactions in an Economy 
 
 
 
3.2 The GTAP Framework 
 
GTAP relies upon the assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, as 
well as Armington’s assumption, which differentiates commodities by their country of origin and 
models imports from different sources to be imperfect substitutes. With 140 countries and 57 
categories of goods in the Version 7 database of 2011, the model is particularly beneficial for 
analyzing varying impacts to sectors, regions and factors of production (labour, capital, land, 
etc).  According to Mensbrugghe (2015), the model tracks the flow of bilateral trade between any 
pair of regions for all sectors and also measures international capital flows which respond to 
relative changes in expected rates of capital returns across regions. 
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3.3 Aggregations and Variables 
 
The geographic aggregation comprises of the NAFTA countries and their main trading 
partners of automotive parts and finished vehicles. The NAFTA countries consist of Canada, 
Mexico and the U.S.A. According to the Centre for Automotive Research, Mexico and Canada 
contribute to approximately 37% and 11% respectively of the U.S.’ total automotive parts 
imports, as well as 24% and 22% respectively of its total finished vehicle imports. Excluding 
domestic producers in the U.S., the highest number of vehicles sold were those produced from 
Canadian and Mexican firms. Since the NAFTA countries’ other main trading partners in the 
automotive sector are the European Union (EU) and Japan, these regions are aggregated 
separately for the study. All other countries are categorized as “the rest of the world”. 
 
The 57 categorized goods produced in the economy are aggregated under 10 categories: 
automotive parts and finished vehicles, manufacturing, metals, oil, coal, petroleum and coal 
products, machinery and equipment, road transport, agriculture, and services. The rest of sectors 
are aggregated as “the rest of the sectors.” Because the automotive industry is closely related to 
the sectors of manufacturing, metals, machinery and equipment and road transport in terms of 
their intermediate inputs and proportion of skilled to unskilled labour, those four sectors are the 
most likely to experience shifts in the allocation of factors of production and are thus aggregated 
as such. Furthermore, agriculture is a significant sector for employment, as it forms 13% of the 
total employment in Mexico, according to the World Bank. The same applies for the services in 
the two other NAFTA countries and the EU, as it contributes over 70% to real GDP in most 
industrialized countries. Meanwhile, the other sectors of oil, coal, and petroleum and coal 
9
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products form a large proportion of exports from the perennial “swing states” (refer to section 
4.2 on modified tariffs). 
The factors of production are then aggregated into the standard five categories: capital, 
land, natural resources, and two types of labour, skilled and unskilled. Labour was separated into 
those categories as the proportion of factor income from both types of labour differs among 
different sectors and regions. In the automotive sector specifically, unskilled labour accounts for 
approximately 30%  of factor income share and unskilled labour accounts for 20% and above of 
the factor income share in Canada, the EU and the U.S., while skilled labour is far less prominent 
in Mexico, where it accounts for only 3% of factor income share. 
This study will simulate the effects of U.S imposed auto tariffs of 25% on automobile 
parts and finished vehicles. In order to do so, three simulations will be conducted: the 
implementation of tariffs with no retaliation, tariffs with retaliation back on the same automotive 
products, and tariffs with retaliatory measures directed at the top exports of politically significant 
states in the U.S (coal, oil and petroleum and coal products). Through all simulations, there is a 
study in the changes in prices, wages and macroeconomic performance. In the last simulation, a 
sensitivity analysis is applied and the elasticity doubled. 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics and Calibration 
 
4.1 Tariffs Structures 
 
 In order to understand the impacts of the U.S. tariffs on automotive imports, it is 
necessary to understand the current state of trade relationships within the NAFTA countries and 
with the EU.  Because the version of GTAP used in the simulations is based on 2011 data, tariffs 
were updated to reflect 2018 values. Notable changes between 2011 and 2018 include the 
signing of the Canada-EU Free Trade Agreement (CETA) in 2016 and new updates to the 
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Mexico-EU Free Trade Agreement in 2018, in which nearly all traded goods between the EU 
Mexico will be duty-free (the only exceptions are select agricultural products which are not the 
focus of this paper.) It is important to note however, that the simulations are done before the 
implementation of aluminum and steel tariffs and their respective retaliatory measures in order to 
gauge the net effects of the U.S. auto import tariffs independently.  
Tables 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d display the tariff structures (as an Ad-Valorem Percent rate) on 
imports into Canada, Mexico, the United States and the European Union respectively. Because of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, there are no tariffs on imports to most sectors in 
Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. However, because of certain sectoral tariff exemptions, some 
countries are allowed imposing tariffs to protect important domestic industries. For example, as 
shown in Table 1b, the Canadian government’s supply management policy explains the higher 
import tariffs on agriculture. There are tariffs applied to Japan and countries in the category of 
“rest of world” as NAFTA is not a customs union. 
Table 1a. Import Tariffs from Region X into the U.S. 
 
 Canada Mexico EU Japan Rest of World 
autoparts 0 0 2.5 1.2 0.833 
roadtransprt 0 0 0.073 0.368 0.467 
manufact 0 0 0.919 1.84 1.07 
metals 0 0 1.21 1.63 1.05 
machinequip 0 0 0.858 0.993 1.12 
coal 0 0 0 0 0 
petrol_coalp 0 0 1.61 1.25 0.924 
oil 0 0 0.1 0 0.062 
services 0 0 0 0 0 
agriculture 0.193 0.02 4.58 1.25 1.03 
rest 0.272 0.019 1.74 1.57 3.18 
Source: Own aggregation of the GTAP model  
11
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 Table 1b. Import Tariffs from Region X into Canada 
 
 USA Mexico EU Japan Rest of World 
autoparts 0 0 0 4.84 4.48 
roadtransprt 0 0 0 0.127 1.23 
manufact 0 0 0.001 2.98 2 
metals 0 0 0 0.33 0.329 
machinequip 0 0 0 0.346 0.55 
coal 0 0 0 0 0 
petrol_coalp 0 0 0 1 0.194 
oil 0 0 0 0 0 
services 0 0 0 0 0 
agriculture 6.83 0.09 0.013 0.734 7.83 
rest 2.49 0.381 0 1.68 3.88 
Source: Own aggregation of the GTAP model 
Table 1c. Import Tariffs from Region X into Mexico 
 
 USA Canada EU Japan Rest of World 
autoparts 0 0 0 4.52 15.3 
roadtransprt 0 0 0 0.314 7.28 
manufact 2.29 0 0 3.54 9.19 
metals 0.045 0 0 4.15 4.81 
machinequip 0.087 0 0 2.29 5.48 
coal 0 0 0 0 0.038 
petrol_coalp 0 0 0 2.53 2.61 
oil 0 0 0 0 4.65 
services 0 0 0 0 0.001 
agriculture 0.473 0.242 0 0.572 7.63 
rest 0.255 1.24 0 1.91 5.61 
Source: Own aggregation of the GTAP model  
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Table 1d. Import Tariffs from Region X into EU 
 
 USA Canada Mexico Japan Rest of World 
autoparts 10 0 0 7.34 2.26 
roadtransprt 0.742 0 0 3.04 0.422 
manufact 0.921 0 0 1.74 1.23 
metals 1.79 0 0 1.4 0.768 
machinequip 1.29 0 0 1.94 1.02 
coal 0 0 0 0 0 
petrol_coalp 1.76 0 0 1.93 0.112 
oil 0 0 0 0 0 
services 0 0 0 0 0 
agriculture 3.73 0 0 0.437 2.14 
rest 2.48 0 0 3.05 2.84 
Source: Own aggregation of the GTAP model  
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Modified Tariffs: 
 
This study assesses the impacts of U.S. auto import tariffs through three scenarios: the 
implementation of harsh tariff structures without retaliation, with in-kind retaliation, and 
retaliation on politically significant exports of the U.S. In all scenarios, it is assumed that CETA 
and the Mexico-EU FTA remain as is and no tariffs are applied except for those by the U.S. and 
those imposed as retaliation back on U.S. imports. The first scenario assumes 25% tariffs apply 
to both automotive parts and finished vehicles without retaliation, while the second scenario 
assumes that Canada, Mexico, the EU and Japan apply retaliatory tariffs of 25% on automotive 
imports from the U.S. In comparison to other current and pending U.S. tariffs as of May 2018, 
the automotive tariffs affect the largest value of exports from the U.S. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Current, Pending and Potential U.S. Tariffs 
Tariff Status (as of May 31, 2018) Value of Imports 
Solar panels & washing 
machines In effect $10.3 billion 
Steel and aluminum In effect (some exemptions) $44.9 billion 
1,333 Chinese products  
Implemented shortly after June 15, 
2018 $46.2 billion 
Automobiles and auto parts 
Under investigation by Commerce 
Department $261.6 billion 
Source: Peterson Institute of International Economics 
 
 
 
While the first two scenarios focus mainly on the trade dynamics with tariffs solely 
imposed the automotive sector, the third scenario assumes that the major exporters of automotive 
parts and finished vehicles impose retaliatory tariffs which target the main exports of perennial 
swing states in the United States which voted for the Republican party in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the Republican 
states of Wyoming, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania are the top exporters of coal, 
while Texas and North Dakota are the top exporters of oil, and Louisiana’s most valuable export 
in 2017 was petroleum and coal products. Given such, the retaliatory tariffs by Canada, Mexico, 
the EU and Japan are set to 25% on over $100 billion worth of coal, oil, and petroleum and coal 
products, a strategy which is consistent with the EU’s threat of tariffs on up to $300 billion U.S 
goods in the event of auto tariffs and current Canadian retaliatory measures to steel and 
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aluminum tariffs which target U.S. exporters in key states in order to maximize the political 
pressure in the U.S. These retaliatory tariffs not only strategically target the important exports of 
Republican states but also target the products which the trading partners are able to impact, as 
they import a significant share of them. For example, according to the Thomson Reuters Eikon 
trade flows monitor and the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Canada and Mexico 
comprise of 47% of U.S. petroleum product imports by share of total imports in 2017, Japan 
comprises nearly 10% of U.S. coal import shares, and the EU imports 12% of U.S. crude oil 
(peaked at 2017 at approximately 2.2 million tonnes). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Results Analysis 
 
5.1 U.S Imposed 25% Tariffs on Auto Imports with no Retaliation 
 
The first simulation assumes the U.S. tariffs are imposed on all countries at a 25% rate for all 
automotive parts and finished vehicles, without retaliation. Free trade between Canada and 
Mexico, as well as free trade Canada and the EU (through CETA) remains. The default closure 
of GTAP is used, where labour is the fixed, endogenous variable.  
 
Overall Trade Trends 
 
Overall, the automotive sector’s exports from and to the U.S. decreased, whereas for Canada and 
Mexico, there was trade diversion to the EU. This is due to the fact that there are no tariffs 
between Canada and EU (CETA) and Mexico and the EU, resulting in comparatively lower 
prices for goods between those regions as opposed to those exported to the U.S. However, there 
15
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is an overall decrease in imports to all countries because this increase in export sales through 
trade diversion is still offset by the loss of trade with the United States.  
 
Table 3: Percent Change in Export Sales of Auto Parts From Importing Country (column) 
to Exporting Country (row) 
 
 USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
USA -42.13 -12.59 -13.61 -8.11 -7.54 
Canada -36.3 -4.11 -5.24 45.85 1.49 
Mexico -34.88 -2.01 -2.97 3.48 3.73 
EU -33.01 26.75 -6.5 -0.27 0.13 
Rest of World -34.14 -5.41 -6.48 -0.23 0.17 
 
 
 
 
Market Price 
Table 4: Percent Change in Consumer Price for Automotive Sector Commodities  
USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
7.567 0.284 0.013 0.057 0.073 
 
Consumer price increased for all 3 NAFTA countries and the EU in response to U.S. tariffs on 
auto imports, yet most significantly in the U.S. This is because the U.S. depends most on 
intermediate good imports in the world, as they accounted for 43% of total U.S. good imports. 
This dependence is particularly pronounced in the auto sector, where states such as Ohio, 
Indiana, Texas, Tennessee and Kentucky import a combined total of $15 billion in auto parts 
from its NAFTA partners. Tariffs imposed on each of those intermediate goods which contribute 
16
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enormously to the automotive sector of the U.S. would cause costs for firms to skyrocket, or 
moving production to less efficient domestic firms would also similarly increase costs. 
According to author Bernard Swiecki of the Centre for Automotive Research 
(2018), Mexican components such as engines and transmissions produced in Mexico are often 
less expensive than their U.S. counterparts because of lower Mexican labor costs. The cost 
advantage with trade is shown below in the table based on Generic $25,000 Vehicle Produced in 
Mexico for U.S. or European Markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Total Per Vehicle Export Cost Advantages 
Source:  CRS, based on conversation with the author, Bernard Swiecki, The Growing Role of Mexico in the North 
American Automotive Industry (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Automotive Research, 2016), p. 46 
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Since this simulation assumes fixed labour, the rising costs from inefficient production are 
passed on most to American consumers. The other NAFTA partners actually see the least 
increase in prices, as even though there are hiked costs for intermediate imports to the U.S., trade 
between Canada, Mexico, the EU and the rest of the world continues without an additional 25% 
import tariff. Similarly, the EU experiences a smaller increase in prices because European firms 
are still able to import and export auto parts to and from other countries, minimizing the impact 
of costlier trade of intermediate goods. This is evidenced by its increased export sales to the rest 
of the world (+0.13%) and Canada (+26.8%), shown in Table 3 above. 
 
 
 
 
Wages 
Table 6 shows how total wages adjust after the imposition of tariffs, assuming that labour is the 
fixed, endogenous variable. The increase in total wages in the U.S. is attributable to an increased 
demand for labour in the automotive sector, as quantity of domestic production increases in 
response to consumers substituting foreign imports for domestic products. However, given that 
demand for labour in more than 7 other sectors decreases, it is likely only wages in the 
automotive sector which increase. On the other hand, the EU experiences a total increase in 
wages not because of the automotive sector but because of other sectors such as the services, 
agriculture and capital goods (+1.7% total) which offset the harms to the automotive sector.  
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Table 6: Percent Change in Wages  
 USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
UnSkLab 0.12 -0.53 -0.9 0.06 0.04 
SkLab 0.05 -0.55 -1.22 0.06 0.07 
 
Welfare 
The varying demands for labour can be accounted for by resources being allocated differently. 
The efficiency of such allocations is one of the factors which determine the welfare of a country. 
Since the U.S. is imposing the tariffs on auto imports and protecting the currently less 
competitive domestic sector, its allocative efficiency is the lowest. Terms of trade and 
investment savings however, offset that and result in overall greater welfare for the U.S. The 
high terms of trade show that the value of U.S. exports increase relative to its imports, allowing 
the U.S. to purchase more imports for each unit exported. Welfare for other countries decreases, 
with that of Mexico decreasing the most due to low terms of trade (price of exports decrease by 
0.13%) and that of the EU decreasing the least due to higher terms of trade (costs of exports 
rise). 
Table 7: Changes in Macroeconomic Performance (in millions) 
 Allocative Efficiency Terms of Trade 
Investment 
Savings Total 
USA -9828 5164 5256 592 
Canada 182 -2606 -126 -2550 
Mexico -151 -2893 134 -2910 
EU -965 996 -620 -589 
Rest of World 996 694 -4370 -2680 
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5.2 U.S Imposed 25% Tariffs on Auto Imports with Reciprocal Tariffs 
The second simulation used the same shocks as the prior simulation, only with the addition of 
retaliatory tariffs from Canada, Mexico, the EU and Japan of 25% on auto imports likewise. Free 
trade between Canada and Mexico, as well as free trade Canada and the EU (through CETA)  
remains. The default closure of GTAP is used, where labour is the fixed, endogenous variable. 
 
 
Overall Trade Trends  
 
Table 8: Change in Export Sales of Auto Parts from Exporting Region (rows) to Importing 
Region (columns)  
 
 USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
USA 0 -55.01 -59.84 -58.46 -5.83 
Canada -44.8 0 28.66 25.56 -13.36 
Mexico -40.14 56.32 0 -5.43 -6.07 
EU -31.84 123.88 49.17 0 0.31 
Rest of World -32.73 67.72 49.76 1.75 0 
 
 
 
As evidenced in Table 8, only the U.S. completely decreases trade with all other 3 regions. There 
is more trade diversion to Canada, Mexico and the E.U. as there are no tariffs in CETA and 
between the EU and Mexico for automotive imports. Despite this, there is an overall decrease in 
trade in all countries (refer to Table 9 below) because this increase in export sales through trade 
diversion is still offset by the loss of trade with the United States. 
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Table 9: Percent Change in Aggregate Imports into Region 
 
USA Canada Mexico EU Japan Rest of World 
-37.02 -17.74 -18.49 -0.02 -3.78 -0.2 
 
 
Market Price: 
 
Table 10: Percent Change in Consumer Price of Automotive Sector Commodities  
USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
7.77 10.3 5.62 0.34 0.19 
 
Table 10 displays the percent change in market prices after the implementation of the 25% auto 
tariffs and reciprocal retaliatory tariffs of 25%. The auto tariffs and their respective retaliatory 
tariffs also on the automotive sector’s imports have increased the price per unit of imported good 
from all countries. However, the impact is most notable in Canada, likely because trade is more 
important as indicated below in Table 11 by Canada’s comparatively higher percent of trade to 
output.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Quantity of Automotive Trade in Millions and Percent of Trade to Output 
 
Country Exports Imports Total Trade Quantity %Trade to Output 
USA 114258 215703 329961 53.36 
Canada 56329 62224 11855300 118.43 
Mexico 70801 34261 105062 96.24 
EU 654104 505497 1159601 100.05 
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 This demonstrates how the auto sector in North America is highly integrated, as auto parts can 
cross the NAFTA borders up to 8 times before being installed in a final assembly plant in either 
Canada, Mexico or the US (Wilson C.E., 2011). According to the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, nearly all of the major automotive brands use a parts sourced from 
abroad, even if the vehicles are assembled in the United States. For example, the Chevrolet 
Suburban  draws a larger share of its parts from Mexico than from the United States and Canada 
combined. The more important trade of these auto parts and vehicles is, the higher the price per 
unit of imported commodity, as shown by the higher prices in Canada (+3.13%), Mexico 
(+1.48%) and the US (+1.41%). However, it is notable that while trade of commodities from the 
auto sector is important in the EU (% trade to output is higher than the US), its price per unit of 
imported commodity did not increase as drastically. This may be because the EU’s auto sector 
exports proportionally the least to the U.S. (as shown in Table 12 below) and thus, the price is 
not as affected by the tariffs imposed on auto parts going to and from the U.S. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Quantity of Exports from NAFTA Region (rows) to Region X (columns) in 
Millions 
 
 USA Canada Mexico EU Japan 
Rest of 
World Total 
USA 40581 4505 3821 431206 9370 164620 654104 
Canada 52451 0 1441 526 57.6 1854 56329 
Mexico 51227 5065 0 4840 302 9368 70801 
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Wages 
 
Table 13: Percent Change in Wages with Employment Fixed 
 
 USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
UnSkLab -0.21 -0.73 -0.9 0.17 0.11 
SkLab -0.28 -0.77 -1.15 0.18 0.15 
 
Table 13 shows how wages adjust after the imposition of tariffs, assuming that labour is fixed. 
The total wages for skilled and unskilled workers increased in the EU, yet decreased in the 3 
NAFTA countries. The slight increase in wages in the EU and decrease in wages in Canada and 
Mexico can be attributable to their respective changes in demand for labour. The demand for 
skilled and unskilled labour in the EU increased by 0.13% and 0.15% respectively, likely due to 
the trade diversion to the rest of the world as shown in Table 10. This increase in demand for 
labour is proportional to its approximate increase in wages. The opposite is true for Canada and 
Mexico, which are more heavily dependent on the U.S. given the integrated nature of the 
NAFTA networks for intermediate auto imports. The demand for both types of labour decreased 
significantly in Canada and Mexico, thus also decreasing the wages.  
 
 
 
Table 14: Percent Change in Demand for Labour 
 
 USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
UnSkLab 4.38 -20.1 -15.24 0.35 -0.02 
SkLab 4.47 -20.06 -14.96 0.34 -0.07 
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The U.S. may appear as an exception, as its demand for unskilled and skilled labour increased, 
while its wages for both types of labour decreased (-0.17% and -0.24% respectively).This may 
be because while the demand for skilled and unskilled labour in the automotive sector may have 
increased, demand for labour decreased in other related sectors such as the petroleum and coal 
products and services. The decreased demand and therefore quantity of labour in other related 
sectors may have offset the gains in employment in the automotive sector, shown in Table 14. 
The decrease in demand for unskilled and skilled labour in the services (-0.17 and -0.07 
respectively) is particularly detrimental, as the former sector employs over 70% of all workers in 
the U.S. economy. Other gains in sectors such as manufacturing and the metals are more 
significant, yet the sectors overall form a smaller share of contribution to total employment. That 
results in lower demand for employment overall, driving down wages for most workers in the 
U.S. 
Table 15: Percent Change in Demand for Labour in U.S. Sectors 
 autoparts roadtransprt manufact metals machinequip coal 
UnSkLab 4.39 0.02 0.38 0.74 0.05 0.09 
SkLab 4.49 0.14 0.48 0.84 0.14 0.11 
 
 petrol_coalp oil services agriculture rest CGDS 
UnSkLab -0.03 0.16 -0.17 -0.06 0.2 -2.32 
SkLab 0.06 0.18 -0.07 -0.03 0.28 -2.25 
 
 
Welfare 
 
Overall, the welfare in each country decreased, with the United States harmed most 
significantly and the EU benefiting. Welfare is determined by the three concepts of allocative 
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efficiency, terms of trade and investment savings. Allocative efficiency represents how optimal 
the distribution of goods and services is, based on consumer's preferences, where negative values 
represent a decrease in efficiency and positive values represent an increase in efficiency. Terms 
of trade is the ratio of an index of a country's export prices to an index of its import prices--a 
higher value indicates that the region’s exports are more valuable relative to their imports, 
allowing them to purchase more imports for each unit they can export. With the imposed tariffs 
and reciprocal retaliatory tariffs, the U.S. has the highest loss of welfare due to its 
disproportionately negative allocative efficiency. This is because the tariffs take resources from 
more competitive sectors towards domestic automotive firms which would have not been as 
efficient without protection. The EU may have benefited from the tariffs and their likewise 
retaliation on the U.S. due to trade diversion to the rest of the world (refer to Table 8). This trade 
diversion thus increased its terms of trade, offsetting the negative allocative efficiency.  
 
Table 16: Changes in Macroeconomic Performance (in millions) 
 
 Allocative Efficiency Terms of Trade Investment Saving Total 
USA -11251 -2649 3253 -10647 
Canada -3002 -1164 -90.4 -4257 
Mexico -1356 -1155 106 -2405 
EU -1296 3509 -276 1938 
Rest of World 1532 1168 -2834 -134 
 
 
 
5.3 U.S Imposed 25% Tariffs on Auto Imports with Politically Targeted Retaliatory Tariffs 
The third simulation used the same shocks as the prior simulation, only with the retaliatory tariffs 
from Canada, Mexico and the EU on the largest exports of the perennial swing states which 
voted for the Republican Party in the 2016 Presidential Election. Free trade between Canada and 
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Mexico, as well as free trade Canada and the EU (through CETA) will remain. The default 
closure of GTAP is used, where labour is the fixed, endogenous variable. The elasticity of 
automotive products was also doubled in the simulation. 
 
Overall Trade Trends 
As evidenced in Table 17 below, automotive trade with the U.S. decreases across all regions, 
with the most occurring in the NAFTA countries where multiple instances of border crossing in 
the production process of vehicles create higher costs for imports than for other regions. The 
Canada-EU Free Trade Agreement explains the trade diversion from the EU and Canada to each 
other (+26.45 EU exports to Canada and +46.63 Canadian exports to EU). Canada, Mexico the 
EU also increase trade to the rest of world, likely countries such as Japan and South Korea, 
where exporting is relatively less expensive than when compared with that to the U.S.  
 
Table 17: Change in Export Sales of Automotive Commodities from Exporting Region 
(rows) to Importing Region (columns)  
 
 USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
USA 0 -12.67 -13.61 -7.94 -7.33 
Canada -36.07 0 -4.91 46.63 2.06 
Mexico -34.87 -2.11 0 3.65 3.95 
EU -33.1 26.45 -6.65 0 0.2 
Rest of World -34.3 -5.74 -6.74 -0.35 0.12 
 
Market Price 
The private consumption price for automotive commodities increases in all countries, most 
drastically in the U.S. However, the price increase in Mexico is nearly negligible. This may be 
explained by the decrease in world demand for Mexican cars (exacerbated by the doubled 
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elasticity), evident by the substantial decrease in production of automotive commodities              
(-18.07%). The reduced demand decreased the supplier price in Mexico (-0.74%) and thus 
resulted in a negligible increase in consumer price (the difference between the supplier and 
consumer price is due to taxes).  
Table 18: Percent Change in Consumer Price of Automotive Sector Commodities 
USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
7.56 0.26 0.01 0.08 0.11 
 
Table 19: Percent Change in Supplier Price of Automotive Products 
USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
1.28 -0.37 -0.74 0.17 0.15 
 
The same explanation applies to Canada, where the supplier price decreases by approximately 
half as much as Mexico and its resulting market price is higher. It is important to note that the 
supplier price still increases, though Canadian production of automotive parts decreases by 
nearly 5% more than Mexico (suggesting lower world demand for Canadian automotive 
commodities.) This discrepancy may be because although demand and therefore production 
decreases more in Canada, supplier price still increases because the rental rate of capital for 
Canada is relatively higher than for Mexico (0.05%). Finally, the EU experiences a smaller 
increase in market prices than in Canada, despite having an increased supplier price, likely due to 
relatively lower taxes on the producer and/or consumer.  
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Wages 
 
Table 20: Percent Change in Total Cost for Factors of Production 
 USA Canada Mexico EU Rest of World 
Land -0.69 -1.04 0.47 0.16 -0.12 
UnSkLab 0.13 -0.78 -1.05 0.03 0.08 
SkLab 0.05 -0.8 -1.36 0.05 0.11 
Capital 0.03 -0.85 -1.44 0.06 0.08 
NatRes -7.02 1.12 2.77 2.7 0.03 
 
When labour is fixed and wages are able to adjust, it is evident that the total wages of the U.S. 
and EU increase, while they decrease in Canada and Mexico. The total wages of the U.S 
increases, fuelled primarily by the 10% increase in demand for both skilled and unskilled labour 
in the automotive sector. As a result of the tariffs, the domestic automotive industry becomes 
more competitive and expands, shifting capital and labour from other sectors such as that which 
products petroleum and coal products or coal, where labour demands decrease.  
 
Table 21: Percent Change in Demand for Labour in U.S. Sectors 
 Autoparts Roadtransprt Manufact Metals Machinequip Coal 
UnSkLab 10.52 -0.1 -0.27 0.9 -0.57 -4.1 
SkLab 10.63 0.02 -0.17 0.99 -0.47 -4.09 
Capital 10.65 0.05 -0.15 1.01 -0.45 -4.08 
 
 
 Petrol_coalp Oil Services Agriculture Rest CGDS 
UnSkLab -4.21 -1.08 -0.17 -0.4 -0.13 -2.01 
SkLab -4.12 -1.06 -0.07 -0.36 -0.05 -1.93 
Capital -4.1 -1.06 -0.05 -0.36 -0.03 -1.92 
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Notably, the wages for unskilled labour in the U.S. automotive sector increases twice as much as 
that of skilled labour (+0.13% compared to +0.5%) as the sector is more unskilled labour 
intensive.  
 
As expected, Canadian and Mexican wages drop as a result of the hits to domestic producers of 
automotive commodities that would have been imported to the U.S. The decrease in export sales 
to the U.S. (-12.67% and -13.61% for Canada and Mexico export sales respectively) is 
damaging, given the U.S. is their main trading partner in the sector due to the tariff-free routes 
created through NAFTA. On the other hand, EU wages increase due to an increase in demand for 
labour in 7 sectors: manufacturing, coal, petroleum & coal products, oil, services, agriculture and 
capital goods, which offset marginal decreases in demand for labour in the automotive sector. 
 
 
Table 22: Percent Change in Demand for Labour in EU Sectors 
 
 Autoparts Roadtransprt Manufact Metals Machinequip Coal 
UnSkLab -1.3 -0.22 0.05 -0.27 -0.04 2.49 
SkLab -1.32 -0.25 0.03 -0.28 -0.06 2.49 
 
 Petrol_coalp Oil Services Agriculture Rest CGDS 
UnSkLab 1.69 0.07 0.08 0.06 -0.06 0.5 
SkLab 1.67 0.07 0.06 0.06 -0.07 0.48 
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Welfare 
 
Table 23: Changes in Macroeconomic Performance (in millions) 
 Allocative Efficiency Terms of Trade Investment Savings Total 
USA -10914 3169 4931 -2813 
Canada -734 -2610 -104 -3448 
Mexico -1094 -2449 149 -3393 
EU -865 2353 -560 928 
Japan -206 -1402 -256 -1863 
Rest of 
World 2560 909 -4164 -695 
 
As the country imposing the tariff, the U.S. experiences a “terms of trade gain.” Since the U.S. is 
a large country (its imports and exports are a significant share in the world market for the 
product), their imposed tariffs drives down the export price of commodities from the automotive 
sector. Thus, the pre-tariff price at which the other nations can export automotive commodities to 
the U.S. declines. This allows the U.S. to import more for every unit it exports--hence, the terms 
of trade gain. However, the gains from this are outweighed by the enormous allocative efficiency 
losses, as the firms which previously were more efficient using imported parts now face rising 
costs with imports or less efficient operational costs domestically. Canada is harmed the most, 
mainly as its values of exports decrease relative to the value of its imports. 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper evaluates the effects on wages, prices and overall welfare from the 
implementation 25% tariffs on automotive imports into the U.S.  In particular, the study draws 
the attention of policy makers to the varying outcomes from different retaliatory measures taken 
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against the U.S., with a wide range of possibilities considered--no retaliation, reciprocal 
retaliation on the U.S. automotive exports and politically targeted retaliation.  
 
In the first simulation, all countries face a decrease in net welfare except the U.S., which 
benefits as the large country implementing the tariffs without facing retaliation. However, wages 
decrease in Canada and Mexico. The EU on the other hand, slightly benefits from being spared 
from the worst harms of the tariff breaking up the highly integrated North American automotive 
sectors and its total wages benefit slightly. These trends are also nearly all true in the second and 
third simulation, the EU’s welfare actually increases in the second simulation. The net 
macroeconomic performance of the U.S. decreases substantially due to the losses in allocative 
efficiency from the tariffs on imports and exports of automotive commodities. In the third 
simulation, only the EU marginally benefits overall, experiencing an increase in wages and better 
macroeconomic performance.           
 
Overall in all simulations, consumers are harmed by spikes in prices for automotive 
commodities. Furthermore, total wages are generally hit for marginal benefits in the automotive 
sector.  Across all simulations, the factors of wages and macroeconomic performance 
additionally showed that the EU is marginally affected compared to the NAFTA countries. 
Canada, Mexico and the U.S. experience the most harm given the interconnected networks 
developed by the automotive industry in the NAFTA region and the degree of harm to the U.S. 
depends on the type of retaliatory measures taken by the countries it imposes tariffs on. The 
retaliatory measures of 25% tariffs on U.S. exports of coal, oil and petroleum products in 
simulation 3 with doubled elasticity of automotive commodities proved to effect the most 
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damage to consumers who are faced with higher prices, to workers in majority of the largest 
industries such as the services with decreases in wages, and to the U.S.’ overall macroeconomic 
performance. 
7. Appendix 
GTAP Description of Sectors and Aggregations 
GTAP Description Sector  
Autoparts Vehicles and parts 
Roadtransprt Transport equipment nec, transport nec 
Manufact Manufacturing 
Metals Ferrous metals, metals nec, metal products 
Machinequip Machinery and equipment nec 
Coal Coal 
Petrol_coalp Petroleum and Coal Products 
Oil Oil 
Services Communication, financial services nec, 
insurance, business services nec, recreation 
and other services, public administration, 
defence, health, education, dwellings 
Agriculture Paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains, vegetables, 
fruits, nuts, oil seeds, sugar cane, sugar beet, 
plant-based fibers, crops, animal products, raw 
milk 
Rest Wool, forestry, fishing, gas, minerals nec, meat 
products nec, sugar, food products nec, 
beverages and tobacco products, textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather products, wood 
products, paper products, chemical products 
nec, mineral products nec, electronic 
equipment 
CGDS Capital Goods Commodities  
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